Mao Zedong as a great military strategist said, is well deserved. There is legendary, Mao Zedong experienced and did not leave a scar on the body. This brings us to the question of smoke coming out from the war, Mao Zedong, has conducted hundreds of large and small battles, battles, it does not win every battle?
we must first understand the br> What is victory? What is defeat? figure out this premise, what is ever-victorious out of the question. According to my experience, speaking from a military history, victory has two meanings, one is to eliminate the enemy , although no one is to destroy the enemy but the battles to achieve the desired purpose. If the Soviet Union in the seven-seven Jie Jie Five of the seven war is to destroy the enemy, of course, is victory, not to destroy the enemy in two battles, but the complete task to achieve the expected goal, which is victory, so called did not come back, no doubt, it is defeat; There is also a consuming war, enemies that we have not been eliminated, but the injury is not small, there is no purpose to fight, which was also called for the defeat. If the enemy was completely wiped out called the defeat, the entire settlement of war, there is only one Golden Gate battle. If the consumption of battle called defeat, and that historically more, regardless of what people have. Datong as the Battle of 1946, we annihilate the enemy more than 8,000, but they are killing , very few prisoners. own casualties are great, the city did not take, and finally had to withdraw from battle. We say that it is consumed war is defeat.
more difficult war that consumed the conclusion, in a certain sense This loss can be called fight or defeat. because the battle is not the purpose of realization of large casualties, of course, the specific problems should be. such as the Long March we have a lot of consumption, the loss is enormous. Chairman Mao said, if that is a partial failure, a temporary failure, we admit, but tao said that the total failure of the Long March, which is wrong because we went to the northern Shaanxi, victory. In fact, consumption can not be called a real battle defeat, because our main is not sold, was not eliminated. such as Mao Zedong's military thought, there a is Chilebaizhang? Therefore, Mao Zedong is not victorious, not generally speaking, to analyze, what kind of victory, what kind of failure. This is my first question about, is relatively hard to say clearly the problem. The second problem
war battles of command guidance and different areas. As Mao Zedong, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, he personally commanded many battles, such as the Third against five wins battle, battle of attrition labeled as such victory or defeat with his command of nature has a direct relationship. But the Sino-Japanese War and the liberation war, he was army commander in chief, it is important of course to say in his campaigns and battles, but The main focus on strategic decisions. If he had mistakes, it is strategic decision-making mistakes, not a general failure on the campaign. of course, lost the battle to a specific campaign, may be subject to a telegram of Mao Zedong, not play a decisive role, but he is the decisive battlefield commanders. At the same time the guidance of Mao Zedong is always stressed in the campaign to lower ad hoc disposal of the commander, not everything asked the central government. it depends on whether the victorious Mao Zedong in These issues must be made clear.
third question
battles are many reasons for the failure, there is decision-making, but also problems of command, there is the question of the military action. If that is not generally defeat of Mao Zedong the subject, it is not clear. for many reasons Well, for example, Datong lost the battle, it should be said as the commander of Mao Zedong with the relationship, but also has a relationship with the battlefield command. So to talk about Mao's mistakes, but also his The mistake is one aspect in which? Which level? to be taken into account, analysis and research.
one mistake:
of Mao Zedong during the Liberation War Art of War into the peak period of military thinking is his most mature class. liberation war took more than four years only to destroy the enemy more than eight million, the liberation of the whole of China, such a big victory, but also rare in the world. In this sense, this decision is the right of Mao Zedong inseparable. otherwise we would not get such a big victory. This is the premise. must be affirmed. and then we ask, Mao Zedong in strategic decision-making a mistake not? we say, failure . from the time of speaking is like two or three months, after the war should be said of had some influence. failure is not the time or not, and Chiang Kai-shek negotiations. negotiations is correct, only through negotiations in order to understand the enemy, educate the masses, for a temporary peace, but also to win the time required to prepare their own. The question is January 13, 1946 cease-fire agreement reached after the two parties, too optimistic estimate of the situation, certainly too much for peace. In my opinion Mao Zedong Chiang Kai-shek is very wary of, and failure lies in judging the U.S. imperialism. Mao Zedong went to Chongqing negotiations, has repeatedly said that if the peace negotiations and the Chiang Kai-shek not successful, the Soviet Union may be out of U.S. and British intervention, after intervention Peace may also occur. Zedong in the past are not too many direct dealings with the United States, and indeed the anti-fascist war, the United States and Britain and the Soviet Union, or cooperation in general and, therefore, Susan Guo Mao Zedong's thought through the joint efforts of United States and Britain to pressure the international forces, can stop the civil war launched by Chiang Kai-shek.
Communist truce reached, Political Consultative Conference also adopted five resolutions on February 25 .1946 Communist troops of both sides reached a reorganization plan, Mao Zedong believed that the larger hope for peace. for the implementation of the Agreement .3 6 January he proposed demobilization of forces in two phases, the first phase of demobilization 1 / 3, the second phase of demobilization and then 1 / 3. At that time there were more than 130 million people in our military, such as through the two demobilization to only 40 million has.
should be said that relations with the central decision. But military itself can not say nothing. central directives in the face of the whole army, why not reduce the other field armies, on the contrary, some Field Army also expanded.
But then when the situation has changed, Mao Zedong issued a lot of operational instructions, child slowly turning a few Jin-Cha, field army is not quickly restored, and expand, so to play harmony, Jining, it is not enough troops. Bingshao, the battle to hard hit, of course, Datong, Jining did not play well, still a lot of other reasons.
demobilization or on Mao Zedong left hand. Again in the March 6 in the instructions, he also talked to a very Good arrangements for demobilization, the personnel and weapons into the countryside to prepare for changes in the situation in case of .3 months later, with the face of the gradual exposure of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong proposed based on the play, with the call for peace.
Chongqing negotiations, the CPC Central Committee on August 23, 1945, August 26 opened two Politburo meetings. at Mao talked about this: in the future to move to Nanjing, the KMT to the country's center in Nanjing, the War of Resistance Chongqing and Yan'an two centers will reduce the position. So the CPC Central Committee organs should move Huaiyin, which is considered the ruling Kuomintang recovery center in Nanjing, China *, as the authorities in Huaiyin Participating is easy to deal with the kinds of problems. Huaiyin located in northern Jiangsu plain, from the perspective of the war issue is not the place chosen Huaiyin.
1946 the CPC Central Committee on February 1 to focus on peace, on the instructions of March 15, to both emphasize peace, also stressed the road is tortuous, to prepare for possible emergencies. but after two months. It should also be noted that, Mao Zedong During this time, that is from November 1945, illness due to overwork began to recuperate slowly until the end of December to resume work until after March, are half working half-closed. that time is mainly Liu Shaoqi charge of the work, so some of the responsibility after the head count to Liu Shaoqi. In fact, not a question of who has responsibility in no responsibility, the CPC Central Committee is a collective leadership. including Mao Zedong, including, it should be recognized that on many important issues is the same. new phase operations, it is not in line with the prevailing circumstances of a war plan. South Line project, we usually called the armed onslaught Jin Pulu, that the Shanxi, Shandong, North China Jin Pulu both sides of the three forces in combat, the first stage Shandong to Xuzhou, Bengbu fight between the field army; Shanxi-Field Army to fight Lianyungang to Xuzhou section of Kaifeng, Central China Field Army to fight to Pukou between Bengbu and then, as the case of Jin Ye, Huai River south of the mountain out to fight. This program is offensive in nature, his purpose is to secure a big win, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to accept peace. If we say that we did take was to lead to the liberated areas to fight the enemies of the active defense policy, then 6,7 and July 1946, Mao Zedong, considered is take the initiative to break out, the offensive approach. So we say it is not realistic. because the power was not sufficient to reach an outside line, the enemy is very powerful.
when the southern route planning, the Su Yu had suggestion, he said, according to the strength of his hand, to the Huainan operations (Section of Bengbu to Nanjing East and the West) there are difficulties. First Huainan unfamiliar situation, and second, there are too poor, large formation can not be active. On the contrary in the Soviet Union Su Yu activities for eight years, the situation is very familiar with that war do not have to map. people in very good condition; the same time the Soviet Union a very rich population, so he suggested that the Shanxi and Shandong Field Army Field Army attack Jin Pulu, the Central China Field Army, the first step, played in the Soviet Union, the second step and then moved to Huainan. Zedong saw the proposal, told Chen Yi, you first stop, we'll think about it. see Mao in considering the original plan can not be fully implemented. Later, received Zhou Enlai's briefing, said that Chiang Kai-shek is about to launch a full-scale attack, attack not only liberated the Central Plains, but also to attack other liberated areas.
Mao said in this case, we first make a few victories in the paint, the more politically active, also shows the weakness of the enemy. This is the beginning of the war to master the two basic problems. politically expedient, to win hearts and minds. to see the enemy's weaknesses, as Chiang Kai-shek in the end how much capital, especially the United States armed forces and equipment , can not be wiped out, we lack confidence. As a result, the downtown plan to be changed. then gradually see our favorable conditions for battle in the paint a lot, so Mao Su Yu said, you will be playing in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union won the battle, the role of other regions with large operations in other programs is not considered. By this time, Mao Zedong's views have become victorious on where to hit .1946, where the Soviet Union in the month of July 7-8 Seven fight Jie, along with other regions inside the victory of war, but also made Mao recognized that the implementation of inside operations, active defense is more favorable, although some places to throw away. but lost place is not terrible, the key is to destroy the enemy. to October 1, Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee drafted the , > Mao Zedong's military thinking, an important element to that of warfare. warfare, the most it can help people the flexibility, initiative to play to the highest level. warfare is intended to be confined in a city a place of gains and losses, and to destroy the enemy for the purpose of . Chiang Kai-shek after the occupation is very proud of Yan'an, Mao Zedong said, it was Chiang Kai-shek defeat. So, the downtown planning, is a momentary mistake, but the South line program to change soon, but it is always consistent with Mao Zedong's military thinking. Mao Zedong's good at the same time that reasonable proposals from the following lessons to correct and enrich their own decisions, good at summing up experience from practice, which is also the reach of Chiang price of stone. Chiang price of stone is a very opinionated person.
North Line Scheme four cities, also known as three-way plan. three-way, means an occupation of a section of the Ping-Han Lu, is too Road and Tongpu Road. four cities, simply more capture Shijiazhuang, Baoding, Taiyuan and Datong. The plan has caused some losses. major Datong issues reflected in the play. Datong campaign started from July 1946, first played in the periphery. play should be the county, it is a long time without playing down the casualties we have a great dated 1 .8 T have asked the Jin Mao Review Hebei Military Region, said the county should Jiugong not be able to, what was the reason? ask you to consider how to play the grasp of common ground? If common ground to fight for it, what will happen? hope you quickly and give replies. This shows that Mao also considering Because the county should be very difficult to play, then hit Datong are not sure of it? 2, Jin-Cha-convened meeting of senior cadres, that is playing the most favorable Datong. Datong is a safe play. So officially decided to play Datong The results did not play down. Datong lost, our army began to fall into a passive, and soon occupied by the enemy to Zhangjiakou.
common ground lost to see how, with the three-way four-city plan, since the common ground in the implementation of three-way battle four the case of city-sponsored program. from the circumstances at the time, our army siege of a lack of experience, equipment is also poor. three-way four-city plan is to invade the city-based, so this decision is inconsistent with the actual situation. Mao Zedong, then a person is not the responsibility of light? I see no. because Jinchaji telegram says very clearly, although there are 18,000 people Datong enemy, but the basic are the local forces by the Kuomintang and the puppet woven , rigged, fighting is not strong, but fortifications Xiude Hao. If the well field organization, command well, playing down is not completely possible. So Datong loss, has a relationship with the battlefield commander.
Datong War, playing more than a month before they wipe out the external and Chengguan defenders, then, by the aid of the enemy has Guisui approaching Jining. Datong Datong front-line commander determined to stop attacking, to surround the transfer set of the main offensive Ying Jian ning of the enemy. and for various reasons, failed to reach the purpose of annihilating them, Jining fall, surrounded by common ground forces had to take the initiative to withdraw the rest around. Datong, after losing the Battle of Jining, Mao Zedong has given up three-way four actual city plan, to destroy the enemy inside the implementation of policy .9 18, he gave a telegram Jin-Cha, pointed out: to annihilate the invasion to fight the enemies of Zhangjiakou, but such a plan to annihilate the enemy is under the slogan of defending the mobilization Chahar to destroy the enemy's effective strength-based, not place-based conservative individual, so the main mobility difficulties, actively fighting the enemy to find a good play. Since then, although we lost Zhangjiakou, but began in a broader geographical basis in the liberated areas favorable conditions for the effective elimination of the enemy's operations. North and South line of active defense strategy, the establishment and implementation of timely and gradually narrow the enemy and the enemy troops on the contrast between strong and weak, for the army and later transferred to the strategic offensive and attack the foundation. The third mistake
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third mistake is the beginning of 1948 led by Mao Zedong to Su Yu and the three columns advancing south. Of course, this decision is correct, the current Party circles and some different views.
1947 �� 7 January to September, Liu and Deng, Chen Xie, Chen Su force three-way advance the Central Plains to October in full swing, the battle inside the enemy transferred to the Central Plains, so that our army in Shandong, southern Shanxi, Shaanxi and other regions inside the situation improved, and gradually to the offensive, to recover a lot of ground. Zedong from this experience in that, if the war continues to lead the District of Chiang, the situation in the Central Plains region can be improved. because when fully expanded armed forces in the Central Plains region, the Chiang Kai-shek and are the main forces concentrated in the Central Plains, Central Plains there a stalemate situation. To break this situation, Su Yu, Mao asked to prepare to lead three columns across the river opened up a new battlefield. two and a half later, April 18, 1948, Su Yu After careful consideration, sent a telegram to the Central, the proposed temporary or fight to stay in the Central Plains region, which will help destroy the enemy. At this time, the situation has taken place in the Central Plains will help us change, base has gradually consolidated, and began to play some medium-scale campaign, such as Luoyang campaign and so on. So, after Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and once to the Central further study. In fact, Mao is also studying whether the original plan all right, or he would not name Su Yu opened early to the central to the central .5 secretary of the meeting, approved the views of Su Yu, under the South abandoned the original plan to open up a new battlefield.
attracted to the Central Plains region of the Chiang inside the battlefield in order to improve the situation, this is the good plan. but want deep south Su Yu Chiang area in order to attract the enemy along the southbound main part of the plan is different.
First Jiangnan more water network and mountainous areas, activities up and not so easy in the Central Plains;
second, the Central Plains has been operating for a few months by the army, gradually began to have the conditions for heavy fighting, there is no South;
third, behind the Central Plains may rely on the support of operations, south far from the rear, the need for a very long launch people, business process areas;
Fourth, some of the original Central Plains battlefield Chiang after the elite troops to the south due to equipment limitations, can not play the role, it will not necessarily follow to the south.
so this decision Mao is inconsistent or not fully comply with the South line of battle was for real, so I said he was a mistake on this decision. Of course, we can not say that Su Yu south with three columns will appear after how to unfavorable situation, because history can not be assumed by imagination. But one thing is certain, is not the overall situation was that the smooth development, there is no Yudong, Jinan, Huaihai Campaign is very difficult to say.
in strategic decision-making, Mao Zedong total of it is correct, and indeed was a great commander. But the mistakes of local, local do not meet the objective reality of the decision is Yes, become the enemy because I changed the war, both sides are moving, have sought to secrecy, so Any decisions are not foolproof. valuable is that when he makes decisions and then still keep in mind the changes ahead, always listen to the comments below, and gradually modify their decision to make better, more correct.
just Jianguo , to liberate the problem very complicated. Mao Zedong did not focus more say in operational issues. Kinmen did not play down, there are objective reasons and subjective reasons. not prepared before the war, fighters do not master the battlefield is not highly centralized command the theater commander does not have the energy to play on the Golden Gate on. This had an impact on the campaign's failure. is that he attacked and promote. blindly like to catch before the arrival of Chiang won the Golden Gate reinforcements. crossing and landing, the original Imagine a night to lead two groups of forces, but in fact, the first batch of troops crossing to Kinmen Island, the day was almost spent, and also at low tide, the results come back on the beach like a stranded, sunk by enemy aircraft are , and has no backup boat, not ship the second batch of troops to follow up, do not increase, the three groups on the island three days and nights fighting hard, annihilated.
Central to this responsibility, then there is on Kinmen war is not enough emphasis on the characteristics of crossing not considered fully operational. So after losing the Golden Gate, resort on Hainan Island to accept the lesson, are fully prepared in all aspects. Mao was personally involved in the matter. results in one go and lay on Hainan Island.
Liberation War battlefield thousands of miles of Mao Zedong is indeed a masterpiece of that great strategist. Correspondingly, is the Chiang Kai-shek's defeat. the situation changes so fast, then, as Chiang Kai-shek Where is his mistake?
the ideological rigidity Kai-shek, the status quo. Chiang Kai-shek had a famous case, that to occupy an important step in our urban and transport positions, vertical and horizontal extension of the second step, controlling all the lines, and finally destroy the enemy. Of course, this is from the military said. In fact, the most fundamental thing is the corruption of Chiang Kai-shek himself politically themselves defeated.
Shangougou came out of the Chiang Kai-shek Mao Zedong is still better skill than formal academic training.
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